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social capital theory, which shows that so-
cial collaboration is built on social networks 
that underlie norms of reciprocity and trust-
worthiness. The development of these pro-
social dispositions is in turn enabled in so-
cieties that further extra-familial ties and 
disregard or transcend purely ‘amoral fa-
milist’ interactions [Banﬁ eld 1958]. 
This research project nevertheless 
leaves several unresolved problems. First, 
there is the problem of causality, which de-
rives from a major theoretical dilemma in 
the social sciences. To what extent are pro-
social dispositions the result of structur-
al constraints, such as market integration, 
or rather an active element in structuring 
these constraints [Giddens 1997]? Joseph 
Henrich (Chapter 2) discusses this prob-
lem on a theoretical level by explaining the 
different mechanisms through which the 
structure of interaction affects preferences. 
Yet only future longitudinal research will 
be able to empirically ascertain to what 
extent, and under which conditions, so-
cial structure shapes human motivation/
preferences. Second, the book relies on the 
questionable idea that the any given indi-
vidual is guided by a consistent and uni-
valent body of motives. This entirely dis-
regards the possibility that people weigh 
several (not necessarily consistent) motives 
at the same time and combine them in var-
ious ways in order to arrive at trade-offs in 
their distribution preferences, and that they 
do so differently in different situations. Fu-
ture research should allow for the possibil-
ity of ambivalent motives and identify the 
conditions that give salience to different 
types of motives and trade-offs. The inno-
vative use of the ethnographic (qualitative) 
methods in this book, which may unveil 
different sorts of motives that remain un-
detected by quantitative methods, should 
therefore be deepened in future studies. Fi-
nally, as suggested by Henrich, the book’s 
ﬁ ndings stimulate an evolutionary puz-
zle to be more fully addressed in future 
work: Why do unselﬁ sh motives evolve in 
the face of the evolutionary logic in which 
material advantages can be achieved by 
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Imagine a situation in which you are a 
member of a group of four. Each member 
has a monetary endowment of €10. Your 
task is to decide how much of the money 
to contribute to a common group project, 
while you keep for yourself what you do 
not contribute. After everyone has made 
his decision, all contributions to the project 
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are summed up. Then the money contrib-
uted to the project is doubled, and each 
group member gets a quarter of the money 
in the project, regardless of the amount he 
personally contributed. This decision situ-
ation constitutes a social dilemma. If you 
and the other three group members cooper-
ate fully and contribute your complete €10 
to the project, everyone will receive a pay-
off of €20. However, traditional economic 
theory tells us that you will not reach this 
socially desirable state. Homo economicus 
– a rationally acting individual who is ex-
clusively motivated by material self-inter-
est – will keep the entire €10. Irrespective 
of the contributions of other group mem-
bers, not contributing always maximises a 
person’s own payoff, because €1 contribut-
ed to the project yields him/her a payoff of 
€0.50, which is less than just keeping the €1. 
Thus, traditional economic theory predicts 
no contributions to the common project, 
and the group will settle for the inferior 
state in which everyone earns €10 instead 
of the possible €20. 
The social dilemma just described is a 
ubiquitous phenomenon in human inter-
actions, but frequently the pessimistic pre-
diction derived from the paradigm of ho-
mo economicus is proven wrong. This is 
the central lesson from Moral Sentiments 
and Material Interests. The volume is an ex-
ample of truly interdisciplinary work as-
sembling thought-provoking overviews of 
research on non-selﬁ sh behaviour from an-
thropology, primatology, evolutionary bi-
ology, economics, sociology, political sci-
ence, and social psychology. The authors 
employ a remarkable variety of methods, 
among them laboratory experiments, sur-
veys, formal modeling, simulations and 
extensive ﬁ eld research. 
Overall, the book consists of four parts. 
In their introductory chapter, the four edi-
tors Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Rob-
ert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr, review evidence 
from laboratory experiments which unam-
biguously documents that the assumption 
of egoistic individual motivations does not 
apply in reality. People frequently devi-
ate from the predictions of traditional eco-
nomic theory, and these deviations exhibit 
clear patterns. The central claim of the vol-
ume is that individual motivations are het-
erogeneous. Some individuals might in-
deed pursue their own immediate material 
self-interest. But a notable fraction are mo-
tivated by strong reciprocity, which is de-
ﬁ ned as a predisposition to cooperate with 
others, and to punish those who violate the 
norms of cooperation, even when it is im-
plausible to expect that these costs will be 
recovered at a later date. The existence of 
strong reciprocators possibly changes the 
incentives of egoists. If they anticipate pun-
ishments by the strong reciprocators in the 
case of non-cooperation, and if the costs of 
being punished exceed the beneﬁ ts from 
deviation, cooperation becomes their util-
ity maximising strategy. Gintis et al. thus 
argue that there is an intrinsic propensity 
to cooperate. They further argue that in-
centives designed to induce cooperation 
among egoists often fail to reach a welfare 
enhancing effect, as they could crowd out 
intrinsic cooperation.
The book’s second part, ‘The Behav-
ioral Ecology of Cooperation’, focuses on 
the evolutionary foundations of cooper-
ation. Joan Silk’s insightful review of re-
search on altruism among non-human 
primates shows that monkeys are no ma-
terial egoists at all. Grooming and food 
sharing behaviour illustrates that they in-
cur costs to beneﬁ t others. However, there 
is no evidence that this behaviour is driv-
en by strong reciprocity. Cooperation is 
conﬁ ned to kin and reciprocating others, 
while third-party punishment is apparent-
ly absent among primates. The same point 
holds for the analysis of the evolution of 
food sharing among humans by Hillard 
Kaplan and Michael Gurven. Their study 
shows that long-term asymmetries of food 
transfers among relatives were a precon-
dition of the course of human evolution. 
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Nor do Eric Smith and Rebecca Bliege Bird 
apply the concept of strong reciprocity in 
their chapter. Instead, they use costly sig-
nalling theory, which assumes that altru-
istic behaviour is attributed to information 
asymmetries among individuals. Individ-
uals favour other people in order to sig-
nal certain not directly observable quali-
ties. Group beneﬁ cial signals are favoured 
by the fact that they attract more attention 
than neutral signals. Overall, the chapters 
in part II provide evidence for the preva-
lence of non-selﬁ sh motivations over a long 
period of human evolution. However, they 
do not present evidence for the impact of 
strong reciprocity in that process.
In the ﬁ rst chapter of the third part, 
‘Modeling and Testing Reciprocity’, Ernst 
Fehr and Urs Fischbacher review further 
laboratory evidence which undermines 
the self-interest hypothesis and again high-
lights the heterogeneity of individual mo-
tivations. Like the introduction, this chap-
ter underlines the value of controlled labo-
ratory experiments in research on individ-
ual motivations. Since motivations cannot 
be observed directly, it is only possible to 
infer the underlying motivations from con-
crete behaviour. Field data are inﬂ uenced 
by many factors, which frequently impede 
unambiguous inference. These two chap-
ters impressively demonstrate that experi-
mental research offers an innovative sup-
plement to the traditional social science 
toolkit. In the next chapter, Armin Falk and 
Urs Fischbacher develop a formal model of 
individual behaviour incorporating strong 
reciprocity in utility functions. This is an 
important endeavour as it requires clarity 
concerning the shape of the assumed mo-
tivational forces. Precision on that point is 
essential, because it is possible to rational-
ise any behaviour just by assuming the ap-
propriate motivations ex post. This how-
ever, would only lead to tautological infer-
ences. 
Strong reciprocators incur costs to 
punish non-cooperating others. However, 
this behaviour decreases the ﬁ tness of the 
punisher compared to non-punishing indi-
viduals. Thus, evolutionary forces should 
lead to the extinction of reciprocators in so-
cieties. Robert Boyd, Herbert Gintis, Sam-
uel Bowles, and Peter Richerson present 
ﬁ ndings from simulations demonstrating 
that altruistic punishment can neverthe-
less survive and ﬂ ourish in the course of 
evolution. Group selection plays an impor-
tant role here. Groups containing a consid-
erable number of altruistic punishers are 
able to exclude defectors. These groups 
reach higher rates of cooperation, and 
their resulting superior ﬁ tness levels let 
them grow faster compared to competing 
groups. Thus, group selection can main-
tain strong reciprocity. Rajiv Sethi and E. 
Somamathan use a similar argument. Co-
operation depends on the ability of recip-
rocators to make credible commitments to 
monitor and punish deviating behaviour, 
even if this is costly to them. Applying a 
formal model to a common pool resource 
environment, they analyse the conditions 
under which cooperation can be stabilised. 
Overall, both chapters show that strong 
reciprocity can survive evolutionary pres-
sures. This ﬁ nding, however, does not im-
ply that altruistic punishment actually is 
a behavioural trait designed to improve 
chances of survival. 
The fourth part, ‘Reciprocity and So-
cial Policy’, focuses on the policy implica-
tions of strong reciprocity. In a fascinat-
ing chapter, Elinor Ostrom presents evi-
dence from experiments and a huge body 
of ﬁ eld research indicating that central-
ised governance of common pool resourc-
es can crowd out intrinsic cooperation and 
can thus lead to sub-optimal outcomes. In-
stitutional design is a highly complex task 
which should not ignore the reciprocal 
facets of individual motivations. Christi-
na Fong, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gin-
tis argue that individual attitudes towards 
the welfare state can be traced to recipro-
cal motivations. People are not willing to 
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support the poor when they perceive the 
poor being responsible for their own situ-
ation. This is interpreted as non-coopera-
tive behaviour towards the community, 
triggering a reciprocal response of decreas-
ing support. Similar forces are present in 
the labour market. As Truman Bewley ar-
gues, wages display a downward rigidi-
ty because employees perceive a wage cut 
as an unfriendly act resulting in a recipro-
cal response with lowered work effort. Ex-
amining tax compliance, street crime, and 
the placement of public facilities like waste 
dumps or prisons which put a burden on 
the affected community, Dan M. Kahan al-
so highlights the possible cooperation-dis-
rupting effects of material rewards and 
punishments. For example, high penalties 
for tax evasion might signal a low rate of 
tax compliance, thus decreasing the pro-
pensity of reciprocators to comply. In the 
ﬁ nal chapter, Bowles and Gintis argue for 
the adoption of community governance as 
the framework employed to solve social di-
lemmas, because communities exhibit su-
perior capabilities to enforce social norms.
To sum up, Moral Sentiments and Ma-
terial Interests is an excellent collection of 
interdisciplinary research. The scope of the 
book is much wider still than its subtitle 
suggests. The contributors present compel-
ling evidence that human behaviour is not 
guided by purely selﬁ sh motives. How-
ever, the evidence for the proposed alter-
native, strong reciprocity, is not equally 
strong. Several contributors to the volume 
favour competing explanations like kin se-
lection, strategic reciprocity, or costly sig-
nalling. There are also some open ques-
tions concerning aspects of the concept of 
strong reciprocity. Take, for example, the 
role of intentions. In the introduction the 
editors argue that strong reciprocators re-
spond to fair or unfair intentions of oth-
ers while the fairness or unfairness of the 
resulting outcome is less important. How-
ever, in a strategic interaction, an individ-
ual can hardly observe the true intentions 
of his or her counterparts. For instance, 
an individual cannot distinguish whether 
a counterpart’s generous behaviour stems 
from true kindness or whether that person 
just strategically wants to appear kind in 
order to avoid possible punishment from 
a reciprocator. This argument shows that 
there are several ways of modelling unself-
ish behaviour. Differentiating among them 
needs further effort in modelling and em-
pirical testing.
Nevertheless, the book is a thought-
provoking read that offers many ideas for 
future research. For example, several chap-
ters stress the importance of heterogeneity 
of individual motivations. In every socie-
ty, reciprocators co-exist with egoists and 
other types of individuals. The composi-
tion of a community is an important ex-
planatory factor of the degree of coopera-
tion among its members. The introductory 
chapter shows that there is cultural diver-
sity of human motivations which can par-
tially be explained by the degree of market 
integration and the degree of cooperation 
in production in a given society. Future re-
search should focus on intra-cultural di-
versities of human motivations and search 
for explanations why some people possess 
a propensity to cooperate while others are 
purely egoistically motivated. Such knowl-
edge would be a next step for a deeper un-
derstanding of the foundations of human 
cooperation.
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